Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion
在一个两期古诺寡头博弈中考察不同预先承诺假设对战略贸易政策的影响，发现企业或政府无法预先承诺时，最优政策从出口补贴转为出口税，且学习率对补贴的影响方向取决于政府能否预先承诺，与幼稚产业论点看似矛盾。
We examine the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment \nin a two-period Cournot oligopoly game with learning by doing. The inability of firms \nand governments to precommit to future actions encourages strategic behaviour which justifies an \noptimal first-period export tax relative to the profit-shifting benchmark of an export subsidy. In \nthe linear case the optimal subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with government precommitment \nbut decreasing in it without, in apparent contradiction to the infant-industry argument. \nExtensions to active foreign policy, distortionary taxation and Bertrand competition are also \nconsidered.