Water Markets and Third‐Party Effects
研究跨区域水权交易对农村和城市地区的第三方福利影响，发现无劳动力市场摩擦时水交易提升人均福利，但存在摩擦时可能导致土地荒废和福利下降。
Abstract We examine potential third‐party effects arising from trading water from one region (rural) to another (urban). Using labor, water and heterogeneous land, rural agents produce a traded agricultural good and nontraded service good. Absent job market frictions, increased water trading improves per capita regional welfare, but aggregate service income can increase (decrease) while individual land rents decrease (increase). If labor experiences job market frictions, water trading can trigger socially inefficient land fallowing, and a decrease in per capita regional welfare. Simulation results confirm the no‐job‐market‐friction model predictions.