The Provision of Incentives in Firms
综述了激励提供的理论与实证研究，分析了计件工资、晋升等绩效薪酬的成本与收益，发现个人对绩效薪酬有反应，但合同设计不完全符合理论，且对难以衡量产出的工人激励知之甚少。
This paper provides an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical work on the provision of incentives. It reviews the costs and benefits of many types of pay-for-performance, such as piece rates, promotions, and long-term incentives. The main conclusions are (i) while there is considerable evidence that individuals respond to pay-for-performance, there is less evidence that contracts are designed as predicted by the theory, (ii) there has been little progress made in distinguishing amongst plausible theories, and (iii) we still know little about how incentives are provided to workers whose output is difficult to measure.