The Value of Interest Rate Stabilization Policies When Agents Are Learning
研究在最优货币政策中加入利率稳定目标后，理性预期均衡是否具有预期稳定性，发现对广泛参数范围都是稳定的，与未加入该目标时的结论不同。
We examine the expectational stability (E‐stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in the “New Keynesian” model where monetary policy is optimally derived and interest rate stabilization is added to the central bank's traditional objectives of inflation and output stabilization. We consider both the case where the central bank lacks a commitment technology and the case of full commitment. We show that for both cases, optimal policy rules yield rational expectations equilibria that are E‐stable for a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. These findings stand in contrast to Evans and Honkapohja's findings for optimal monetary policy rules in environments where interest rate stabilization is not a central bank objective.