Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange
分析了马萨诸塞州健康保险交易所中不完全竞争下的保险定价监管，发现年轻消费者价格敏感度是年长者的两倍，导致年长者面临更高加价，更严格的监管将资源从低成本消费者转移至高成本消费者，降低企业利润并增加总消费者剩余。
We analyze insurance-pricing regulation under imperfect competition on the Massachusetts health insurance exchange. Differential markups lead to price variation apart from cost variation. Coarse insurer pricing strategies identify consumer demand. Younger consumers are twice as price sensitive as older consumers. Older consumers thus face higher markups over costs. Modified community rating links prices for consumers differing in both costs and preferences, and changes the marginal consumer firms face. Stricter regulations transfer resources from low-cost to high-cost consumers, reduce firm profits, and increase overall consumer surplus.