How to License Intangible Property
研究一个独立实验室或研究合资企业向产品市场竞争者销售技术许可的最优策略，发现标准定价不是利润最大化的方式，且卖方开发创新的激励可能过高，而传播创新的激励通常过低。
We examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors. We consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture. We show that (1) demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit-maximizing licensing strategy; (2) the seller's incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive; (3) the seller's incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low; (4) larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation, and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs; and (5) a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation.