Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
检验了当薪酬与相对业绩挂钩时，年中表现差的基金经理比表现好的更倾向于在评估后期增加基金波动性，且该效应随行业增长和投资者关注度提高而增强。
ABSTRACT We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as “losers” will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be “winners.” An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth‐oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid‐year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid‐year winners. Furthermore, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.