COLLUSION, FLUCTUATING DEMAND, AND PRICE RIGIDITY*
研究无限重复伯特兰博弈中，企业基于私有信号对需求冲击做出反应时的最优合谋策略，发现当信号精度低时价格刚性出现，并分析了企业数量与耐心程度的影响。
We study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which an i.i.d. demand shock occurs in each period. Each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period, all information but the private signals becomes public. We consider the optimal symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE) mainly for patient firms. We show that price rigidity arises in the optimal SPPE if the accuracy of the private signals is low. We also study the implications of more firms and firms' impatience on collusive pricing.