Ceo selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis
整合代理理论与组织视角，基于118位美国大公司CEO的调查数据，发现CEO选拔、继任规划和薪酬感知显著影响公司绩效，并重新解读了内部与外部CEO的区分。
Abstract This study seeks to extend and unify a set of research issues relating to CEO selection, succession, compensation, and firm performance. The study offers a model of these issues from a combined agency and organizational perspective, and tests the model using archival data and perceptual data from survey responses from 118 CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations. The results suggest that several CEO issues are significant predictors of variation in firm performance, supporting the paper's arguments for (1) a reinterpretation of the insiderfoutsider CEO distinction, (2) the relevance of CEO succession planning, and (3) the importance of CEOs' perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth.