Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
构建了一个投标模型，其中投标人是价格接受者，价格传递信息。均衡价格越高表明出售物品质量越好，投标人只有交易动机或内幕信息才能获利，且价格通常不完全揭示信息。
Most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation, and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable. In this paper, a bidding model is developed which has the market-like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information. Higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices. Bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information. Apart from exceptional cases, prices are not fully revealing. A two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing, resolving a well-known paradox.