Ownership Dynamics with Multiple Insiders: The Case of REITs
研究了面临道德风险时多个风险规避的内部人无法事先承诺所有权政策，导致总持股逐渐下降至竞争市场水平，且内部人数量越多调整速度越快、长期均衡持股越高，并用美国REITs数据验证了模型预测。
We study ownership dynamics of multiple strategic risk-averse insiders facing a moral hazard problem. We show that, when insiders cannot commit, ex ante, to an ownership policy, the aggregate insider stake gradually declines toward the competitive market allocation. Both the speed of adjustment and the long-term equilibrium aggregate insider ownership level are greater for companies with a larger number of insiders, ceteris paribus. Using data from U.S. real estate investment trusts, we then test the model and find that the predictions of the model are verified empirically.