Imperfectly Credible Disinflation under Endogenous Time‐Dependent Pricing
研究了在不完全可信的通胀下降过程中，价格刚性的内生性如何影响实际产出成本，发现定价行为的内生性与不完全可信度的相互作用会提高通胀下降的产出代价。
The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. We examine this interaction in a model with endogenous time‐dependent pricing. Both the endogenous initial degree of price rigidity and changes in the duration of price spells during disinflation are important in explaining the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially consider a setup where the degree of credibility is fixed and then allow agents to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. In both cases, the interaction between endogeneity of pricing behavior and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation.