Open Access and Dynamic Efficiency
研究开放接入政策下，上游资源所有者投资质量的行为，发现若接入费率满足收入中性原则，质量会高于垄断水平且随竞争者数量增加而提升，反驳了动态效率与静态效率不可兼得的观点。
In our model, production of a final good requires access to an excludable resource owned by an integrated firm. The quality of the resource depends on an investment by the owner and impacts the downstream demand curve. Under open access, the owner must share the resource with downstream competitors at a regulated tariff. We show that quality exceeds the monopoly level, and increases with the number of competitors, if the access tariff is set according to a principle we call revenue neutrality. Our results contradict the notion that dynamic efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in static (allocative) efficiency.