Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?
通过理论分析和印度151个村庄的随机实验，研究激励薪酬如何影响代理人向不同社会距离的家庭传播公共健康保险信息，发现激励薪酬能改善向疏远家庭的传播，但对相似家庭无效。
This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance \nin the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as \nempirically the e ect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, \nbut also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to \nanother. In a randomised eld experiment undertaken across 151 villages \nin South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a \npublic health insurance programme. Relative to at pay, incentive pay \nimproves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant \nfrom the agent, but not to households similar to the agent. \n