Commitment Issues in Budgeting
在Antle-Fellingham预算模型中假设中心只能承诺追踪哪些信息但不能承诺如何使用，发现有限承诺下公共信息对效率和代理人福利的影响与原有结论不同。
Antle and Fellingham [1995] study information system design in a budgeting setting in which the center (principal) has the ability to (ex ante) commit to both what information will be gathered (tracked) and the way in which the tracked information will be used.1 In this note on the Antle-Fellingham model, we assume the principal has limited powers of commitment; he can commit to what information will be tracked but not how it will be used. Antle and Fellingham find that installing a public information system that reduces the agent's informational advantage sometimes makes the agent better off, and that more public information sometimes decreases productive efficiency. However, in their model, the principal always prefers more (finer) public information to less (coarser) public information. This preference is driven by the assumed unlimited ability to commit to how the tracked information will be used. The principal can and does commit to using information in a manner that is ex post not in his own