Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market
构建模型，分析教育投资在劳动力市场（高工资）和婚姻市场（影响婚姻剩余份额）的双重回报，探讨男女因工资和家庭角色差异导致的不同教育投资激励，以及均衡状态下教育匹配的变化。
We present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns: the labor-market return, resulting from higher wages, and a marriage-market return, defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract. Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. This asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses. When the labor-market return to schooling rises, home production demands less time, and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken, more women may invest in schooling than men.