Wall Street Occupations
研究了金融工作因高损失风险和努力难以监控而导致的均衡后果，发现这些工作薪酬高、晋升快、工时长的特点，并在繁荣期道德风险加剧。
ABSTRACT Many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses, and hard‐to‐monitor effort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that finance jobs feature high compensation, up‐or‐out promotion, and long work hours, and are more attractive than other jobs. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are “too hard to manage.”