External Networking and Internal Firm Governance
利用标普1500公司面板数据，研究发现CEO权力越大，公司越可能任命与其有关系的董事；这种关系会降低公司价值，尤其在缺乏其他治理机制时，并导致更多破坏价值的并购。
ABSTRACT We use panel data on S&P 1500 companies to identify external network connections between directors and CEOs. We find that firms with more powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint directors with ties to the CEO. Using changes in board composition due to director death and retirement for identification, we find that CEO‐director ties reduce firm value, particularly in the absence of other governance mechanisms to substitute for board oversight. Moreover, firms with more CEO‐director ties engage in more value‐destroying acquisitions. Overall, our results suggest that network ties with the CEO weaken the intensity of board monitoring.