Power dependence, diversification strategy, and performance in keiretsu member firms
将企业集团视为权力依赖系统，研究发现集团内权力大的成员更注重通过产品多元化和国际化追求增长，而权力小的成员则受严格监控、更强调盈利。
Abstract Conceptualizing the keiretsu as a power‐dependence system, we propose that benefits accruing from keiretsu affiliation differ across member firms, depending on their power in (or dependence on) the keiretsu. By integrating power with governance and internal market perspectives on group affiliation, we develop and find general support for the hypotheses that powerful keiretsu member firms are able to place more emphasis on growth in pursuing product and international diversification, whereas less powerful keiretsu member firms are subject to strong monitoring and emphasize profitability. These findings provide support to the study's proposition that power‐dependence relationships in a keiretsu influence member firms' appropriation of group affiliation benefits in pursuing diversification strategies. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.