Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market
提出一种将批发电力支付分解为生产成本、竞争性租金和市场力量所致支付的方法，利用加州1998年6月至2000年10月的数据，发现夏季高需求时段显著偏离竞争定价，2000年夏季市场力量导致59%的电费上涨。
We present a method for decomposing wholesale electricity payments into production costs, inframarginal competitive rents, and payments resulting from the exercise of market power. Using data from June 1998 to October 2000 in California, we find significant departures from competitive pricing during the high-demand summer months and near-competitive pricing during the lower-demand months of the first two years. In summer 2000, wholesale electricity expenditures were $8.98 billion up from $2.04 billion in summer 1999. We find that 21 percent of this increase was due to production costs, 20 percent to competitive rents, and 59 percent to market power.