Taking Stock: Equity‐Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership
研究股权薪酬对管理者所有权的影响，发现低持股管理者激励增强，但高持股管理者通过出售股票抵消效果，且行权后几乎全数卖出，质疑管理者无法对冲风险的假设。
We investigate the impact of stock‐based compensation on managerial ownership. We find that equity compensation succeeds in increasing incentives of lower‐ownership managers, but higher‐ownership managers negate much of its impact by selling previously owned shares. When executives exercise options to acquire stock, nearly all of the shares are sold. Our results illuminate dynamic aspects of managerial ownership arising from divergent goals of boards of directors, who use equity compensation for incentives, and managers, who respond by selling shares for diversification. The findings cast doubt on the frequent and important theoretical assumption that managers cannot hedge the risks of these awards.