The Antitrust Implications of Capacity Reallocation by a Dominant Firm
研究主导企业收购同一市场中的边缘企业并将其产能转移到另一市场时，反垄断机构应如何应对。通过多阶段博弈模型，推导出主导企业收购产能低于社会最优水平的条件，并结合专用移动无线电行业的案例和1994年美国诉摩托罗拉及Nextel案的和解令进行分析。
When a firm acquires rival firms in one market, and moves their capacity to another market, should antitrust authorities be concerned? We address this question by studying a multi‐stage game. A dominant firm has the opportunity to acquire fringe firms that operate in the same market. Then, the dominant firm has the opportunity to move capacity from that market to a second market. The model is motivated by a series of acquisitions in the Specialized Mobile Radio industry aimed at establishing a new cellular carrier. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominant firm to acquire too little capacity relative to the social optimum. The results shed light on the Consent Decree negotiated in US v. Motorola Inc. and Nextel Communications Inc., 1994 .