Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers?
通过多家庭代际实验，发现强制性的跨家庭转移支付会挤出对子女的赠予，但不会显著影响对老人的赡养，且提高了自愿转移的效率。
We give an account of an overlapping–generations experiment with multiple families in which voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Support to the old is a purely intergenerational (intra–family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an element of intra–generational (inter–family) redistribution through a compulsory pension system. Our data show that higher compulsory inter–family transfers lead subjects to place relatively more emphasis on support instead of grants: grants are crowded out, but support is not significantly affected. The efficiency of voluntary transfers increases, however. Furthermore, if subjects give transfers, they do not use tokens of direct reciprocity; evidence of indirect reciprocity in transfer behavior can only be obtained for the case where compulsory transfers are high.