Collusive price rigidity under price-matching punishments
通过分析单位成本随机交替且企业采用价格匹配惩罚策略的无限重复博弈，发现当两种成本水平足够接近时，最优合谋价格随时间保持刚性，这为弯折需求曲线提供了博弈论支持，并进一步研究了价格刚性与高成本阶段预期持续时间、产品差异化程度及企业数量的关系。
By analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price-matching punishment strategy, we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close. This provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve. In contrast to the kinked demand curve, it also generates predictions regarding the level and the determinants of the best collusive price, which in turn has implications for the corresponding collusive profits. The relationships between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a high-cost phase, the degree of product differentiation, and the number of firms in the market are also investigated.