The Role of Commonality between CEO and Divisional Managers in Internal Capital Markets
研究了CEO与部门经理之间的非正式联系（即“关系”）如何影响企业集团的投资决策和资源配置，发现有关系管理的部门获得更多投资，且企业整体价值更高。
Abstract We study the role played by the informal links, or “connections,” between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the divisional managers of conglomerate organizations. Using data on a large sample of multisegment U.S. corporations from 1996 to 2004, we show that segments run by connected managers receive more investment and exhibit lower sensitivity to cash flow shortfalls (and exhibit higher sensitivity to other segments’ cash flow). At the firm level, having more connected managers presiding over segments with high Tobin’s Q improves resource allocation and increases firm value. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the mutual trust associated with connections reduces the need for wasteful reallocation of resources across divisions of conglomerate firms.