Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules
分析透明度对委员会决策的影响，发现秘密投票时成员更顺从既有偏见，而透明委员会更可能接受改革；结合适当投票规则，秘密程序可能比透明程序产生更优决策。
In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one.