A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining
提出了一个有限时间范围的连续时间联盟讨价还价框架，玩家在随机离散时间点出价。该模型下马尔可夫完美均衡的预期收益唯一，且是唯一能被离散时间模型近似均衡的子博弈完美纳什均衡。
We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time bargaining models. We investigate the limit MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to infinity and players get infinitely patient. In convex games, we establish that the set of these limit payoffs achievable by varying recognition rates is exactly the core of the characteristic function.