Dividends, Taxes, and Signaling: Evidence from Germany
利用德国数据检验税收基础信号模型，发现尽管德国股息税负较低，股价对股息消息的反应与美国类似，说明股息的信息传递作用不仅源于税收。
ABSTRACT The higher taxation of dividends in the United States gave rise to theories that explain why companies pay dividends. Tax‐based signaling models propose that the higher tax on dividends is a necessary condition to make them informative about companies' values. In Germany, where dividends are not tax‐disadvantaged and in fact are taxed lower for most investor classes, these models predict that dividends are not informative. However, we find that the stock price reaction to dividend news in Germany is similar to that found in the United States. This suggests other reasons, beyond taxation, that make dividends informative.