LEGAL STANDARDS, ENFORCEMENT, AND CORRUPTION
研究了法律严格程度与执法成本的关系，发现仁慈政府的最优标准随人均收入上升、随官员腐败下降；而自利政府的选择则非单调。跨国环境规制数据支持仁慈政府模型的预测。
Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Because enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per capita income and decreasing in officials’ corruption. In contrast to the “tollbooth view” of regulation, the standard chosen by a self-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials’ corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a benevolent regulator. International evidence on environmental regulation shows that standards correlate positively with per-capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistent with the model’s predictions for benevolent governments.