PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION AND THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION*
分析了政府同时设计非线性所得税和提供公共品时的最优政策比较静态性质，针对两种技能水平的个体，考察社会福利函数权重、商品价格、工作辛苦程度和技能水平变化的影响。
Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by their skill levels, who have the same quasilinear preferences for labor supply and the consumption of a private and a public good. Comparative statics are obtained for the weights in a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, the prices of the two goods, a taste parameter that measures the onerousness of working, and the skill levels.