The Athenian Trierarchy: Mechanism Design for the Private Provision of Public Goods
研究了古典雅典通过私人提供公共物品（如海军防御）的宗教制度，用博弈论分析公民在信息不对称下的激励，评估其效率、可行性和预算平衡，并与历史事件关联。
The liturgical system in Classical Athens (479–322 BCE ) privately provided public goods, including naval defense. I use it to evaluate mechanism design policies and to address uncertainties in the historical record by adding predictive economic theory to research by ancient historians. I evaluate the system's success at meeting the conflicting goals of efficiency, feasibility, and budget balance by analyzing the Athenian citizens' incentives within a game of asymmetric information. In the game, multiple equilibria occur; citizens may or may not volunteer for duty or avoid it. I relate the game theoretic findings to historical events.