Cash and Corporate Control
发现代理权争夺目标公司持有更多现金，且超额现金增加代理权争夺概率；代理权争夺后现金减少、高管更替和特别分配增加，表明代理权争夺能约束现金滥用。
ABSTRACT The takeover market is often suggested as appropriate for containing the agency problems of excessive corporate cash holdings. However, recent studies report contradictory evidence. I focus on the takeover‐deterrence effects of corporate liquidity and suggest the proxy contest as an effective alternative control mechanism. I find that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms, and that the probability of a contest is significantly increasing in excess cash holdings. Proxy fight announcement return also is positively related to excess cash. Following a contest, executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase, while cash holdings significantly decline.