Efficient Timing of Communication in Multiperiod Agencies
研究两期委托代理模型中，代理人收到关于第二期结果的私人信号后，在不同时点（早期、正常、延迟）进行沟通的价值，发现延迟沟通在信息完美时无价值，而早期和正常沟通可平滑补偿，但若代理人能借贷则平滑收益消失。
This paper examines communication in a two-period principal/agent model in which the agent receives a private signal about the second outcome before the first outcome is realized. No communication is compared with communication at three possible dates: before the first outcome (early), at the first outcome/consumption date (normal), and between the initial consumption date and the second outcome (delayed). Delayed communication is shown to have no value if the agent's information is perfect, but can have value if it is imperfect. Early and normal communication can be used to “smooth” compensation across periods and, hence, generally have incremental value over delayed communication if the agent cannot borrow or save. However, the “smoothing” benefits disappear if he can borrow and save. Early and normal communication are equivalent if the agent has domain-additive exponential preferences and the private signal is uninformative about the first outcome. If the private signal is informative about the first outcome, the incremental value of early compared with normal communication attains its maximum for “medium” informativeness. A unifying example is used throughout.