Risk Allocation in Large‐Scale Resource Ventures
分析了大规模资源项目中高启动成本、长建设期和高金融风险的特点，以及经济、技术和政治风险如何通过复杂的合同网络在多个参与者之间分配。
SUMMARY The paper analyzes risk allocation in large‐scale resource ventures. High set‐up costs, a long gestation period of ten years and more and a high financial risk are characteristics for large‐scale resource ventures. Financial risk is the result of economic risk (price risk, cost risk), technological risk (innovation in extraction, exploration) and political risk (taxation schemes, extraction rights). Large‐scale resource ventures represent an interesting case of risk allocation in which many players are involved. Institutional arrangements for risk allocation in large‐scale resource ventures are interpreted as a complex net of contractual relationships between different players. The paper analyzes a theoretical framework in which risk allocation is studied. Policies of risk shifting for the individual agent and institutional arrangements for risk shifting in the case of large‐scale resource ventures are studied. The net of relations between different players is a check on the strategic behavior arising from idiosyncratic problems and thus reduces contract risk.