Tax Smoothing in Frictional Labor Markets
在摩擦性劳动力市场中重新审视税收平滑的最优性，发现拉姆齐最优政策要求劳动税率大幅波动，这种有意的税收波动通过保持扭曲不变来减小劳动力市场波动，但效率更高。
The optimality of tax smoothing is reexamined using frictional labor markets. In a calibrated matching model that generates empirically relevant labor market fluctuations conditional on exogenous fiscal policy, the Ramsey-optimal policy calls for extreme labor tax rate volatility. Purposeful tax volatility induces dramatically smaller, but efficient, fluctuations of labor markets by keeping distortions constant over the business cycle. We relate the results to standard Ramsey theory by developing welfare-relevant concepts of efficiency and distortions based on primitive matching frictions. Although the basic Ramsey principles of "wedge smoothing" and zero intertemporal distortions hold, tax smoothing depends on whether wages are set efficiently.