Heads I win, tails you lose? A career analysis of executive pay and corporate performance
从职业视角分析高管薪酬与公司绩效的关系，利用1996-2008年FTSE 350公司董事会成员的详细职业历史，发现现有安排未能根据职业绩效不佳调整薪酬，并识别出一种“结算”过程，即薪酬根据过去薪酬和绩效进行调整。
The paper adopts a novel career perspective to examine theories of corporate control in the context of executive pay. Detailed career histories of boardroom executives in all FTSE 350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are utilised. The paper highlights the failure of existing arrangements to adjust pay outcomes where career performance is poor. The leading theoretical reasons for this disconnect, namely managerial power and neoinstitutionalism, are not consistent with the data. The paper identifies a settling-up process at work, whereby pay is adjusted in the light of both past pay and past performance. From a policy perspective, a case is made for adopting a cumulative or career-oriented approach to rewarding executive performance through the use of truly long-term incentives in the form of 'career shares'.