Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry
利用1980年代147家美国银行的面板数据，发现放松跨州银行管制后，CEO薪酬水平更高、薪酬与绩效关联更强，且CEO更替率显著上升，表明存在一个将薪酬水平与结构匹配银行业竞争环境的管理人才市场。
This paper examines CEO pay in the banking industry and the effect of deregulating the market for corporate control. Using panel data on 147 banks over the 1980s, we find higher levels of pay in competitive corporate control markets, i.e., those in which interstate banking is permitted. We also find a stronger pay-performance relation in deregulated interstate banking markets. Finally, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation. These results provide evidence of a managerial talent market — one which matches the level and structure of pay with the competitiveness of the banking environment.