Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean
研究了腐败与基础设施政策改革的相互作用，发现独立监管机构能减弱腐败对电力企业效率的负面影响，私有化也有一定缓解作用。
This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and infrastructure policy reforms. I construct a simple model to illustrate how both an incerase in regulatory autonomy and privatisation may influence the effect of corruption. This interaction is then analysed empirically using a panel of 153 electricity distribution firms across 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1995 and 2007. I find evidence that greater corruption is associated with lower firm efficiency, but that this association is reduced when an independent regulatory agency is present. These results survive a range of robustness checks including instrumenting for regulatory governance and corruption. I also find slightly less robust evidence that private ownership further mitigates the association between corruption and efficiency.