STRATEGIC DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATEGIC EMULATION IN GAMES WITH UNCERTAINTY*
研究了当面临共同冲击或独立冲击时，企业选择相同或不同策略的均衡结果，发现利润函数交叉偏导的符号决定差异化或模仿，并应用于技术选择、品牌投资和研发竞赛。
When players who choose a common strategy face a common shock, while players who choose different strategies face independent or imperfectly correlated shocks, equilibrium choices exhibit differentiation (respectively emulation) when the sign of the cross-partial derivative of the firms' profit functions with respect to the realizations of the uncertain variables is negative (respectively positive). I consider a variety of applications, including technology choice, brand investments, and R&D races, many of which can be characterized as two-stage games. In such games I demonstrate that differentiation is more likely to occur when the second stage game is a game of strategic substitutes.