Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises
研究哪些公司特征会使管理层更有动机避免负盈利意外，发现机构持股高、依赖隐性契约、盈余价值相关性强的公司更可能达到或超过分析师预期，且同时通过向上管理盈余和向下引导分析师预测两种机制来实现。
Recent reports in the business press allege that managers take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. I hypothesize that certain firm characteristics are associated with greater incentives to avoid negative surprises. I find that firms with higher transient institutional ownership, greater reliance on implicit claims with their stakeholders, and higher value-relevance of earnings are more likely to meet or exceed expectations at the earnings announcement. I also examine whether firms manage earnings upward or guide analysts' forecasts downward to avoid missing expectations at the earnings announcement. I examine the relation between firm characteristics and the probability (conditional on meeting analysts' expectations) of having (1) positive abnormal accruals, and (2) forecasts that are lower than expected (using a model of prior earnings changes). Overall, the results suggest that both mechanisms play a role in avoiding negative earnings surprises.