Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization
构建了一个企业形成的一般均衡模型，其中组织是内生的。企业是由提供努力和投资资本的代理人组成的联盟。由于激励随代理人财富变化，不同情况下不同类型的代理人会成为有吸引力的企业成员。当借贷成本足够高时，企业组织将取决于财富分配：在高度不平等下，组织可能由富人获取高回报的激励主导，即使所选形式在技术上并非有效的激励方式。
We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital. Effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid, and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem. Because incentives vary with an agent's wealth, different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances. When borrowing is not costly, firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently. But when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe, firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth: with enough inequality, it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth, even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D2, D31, J41, L2.