Strategic Complementarities and the Twin Crises
研究银行债权人群体与货币投机者群体之间的战略互补性如何导致银行危机与货币危机相互加剧的恶性循环，并指出最后贷款人可能无法阻止银行挤兑。
The economic literature emphasised the role of strategic complementarities in generating banking crises and currency crises. Motivated by evidence from recent financial crises, we study a model, where strategic complementarities exist, not only within a group of creditors or within a group of currency speculators, but also between the two groups. The additional type of complementarities generates a vicious circle between banking crises and currency crises. This magnifies the correlation between the two crises and destabilises the economy. We show that, due to the vicious circle, a Lender of Last Resort might not be able to prevent bank runs. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.