Privatization in Emerging Economies: An Agency Theory Perspective
从代理理论出发，分析新兴经济体私有化企业绩效不佳的原因，指出弱治理和少数股东保护不足会加剧代理问题，并提出通过优化所有权和管理结构来提升绩效。
The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization-performance relationship. The authors argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). The authors suggest that postprivatization performance can be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and they highlight avenues for research.