Private Information in Life Insurance, Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets
利用英国老龄化纵向研究数据，分析了寿险、年金和健康保险市场中核保所用信息的差异如何不同程度地削弱私人信息，有助于解释这些市场逆向选择证据不一致的现象。
Abstract Economic theory predicts that private information on risks in insurance markets leads to adverse selection. To counterbalance private information, insurers collect and use information on applicants to assess their risk and to calculate premiums in an underwriting process. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), this paper documents that differences in the information used in underwriting across life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets attenuate private information to different extents. The results are in line with – and might help to reconcile – the mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection across these markets.