Union Leaders as Experts: Wage Bargaining and Strikes with Union‐Wide Ballot Requirements*
研究了工会全体投票要求下，成员仍有动机选举好斗的工会领袖，且即使合同区间非空、信息不完全可解决，均衡中仍可能发生冲突，说明投票要求既不能阻止好斗领袖也不能避免低效冲突。
Abstract To avoid strikes and to curb labour militancy, some governments have introduced legislation stating that union leadership as well as wage offers should be decided through union‐wide ballots. This paper shows that members still have incentives to appoint militant union leaders, if these leaders have access to information critical for the members’ voting decisions. Furthermore, conflicts may arise in equilibrium even though the contract zone is never empty and there is an option to resolve any incomplete information. Ballot requirements hence preclude neither militant union bosses nor inefficient conflicts.