Does Mandated Audit Communication Reduce Opportunistic Corrections to Manage Earnings to Forecasts?
通过两项实验发现，审计师在发现定量不重大的盈余高估时，若更正会导致错过分析师预测，则更不愿要求更正；SAS第89号准则的强制沟通也未能增加此类更正，说明准则难以抑制机会主义行为。
This paper reports two experiments in which Big 5 audit managers estimate reported (audited) earnings conditional on analysts' consensus forecast, auditing standards, and auditor discovery of a quantitatively immaterial earnings overstatement. We find that auditors judge overstatement correction less likely if it would cause a missed forecast, even for objectively measured misstatements. This behavior is consistent with SEC Chairman Levitt's concerns about opportunistic corrections to manage earnings to forecasts. Also, SAS No. 89's mandated representations and communications do not increase corrections that would cause a missed forecast, indicating that the Auditing Standards Board has limited ability to reduce opportunistic corrections through such regulations.