Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
研究企业生产成本信息不对称时，卡特尔协议如何受激励和参与约束影响，发现大卡特尔难以实现垄断结果，但非一致通过规则可缓解激励问题。
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about productions costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be supported, recognizing incentive and participation constraints. If defection results in either Cournot or Bertrand competition, the incentive problem in large cartels is severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome. However if the cartel agreement requires less than unanimous ratification by the member firms, then the incentive problem can be overcome in large cartels. With common cost uncertainty, perfect collusion is possible in large cartels, regardless of the ratification rule.