How does Sub‐National Autonomy Affect the Effectiveness of Structural Funds?
研究了欧盟成员国的联邦结构（分权程度）如何影响结构基金支出促进经济增长的效果，发现分权程度越高，结构基金越有效。
SUMMARY One of the European Union's explicitly formulated goals is reducing the lags in development and narrowing the gaps in income between its member states and regions. In order to attain these goals, the Union's regional policy employs a system of vertical conditional grants known as the Structural Funds. Various attempts have been made to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy in promoting convergence. This paper adds to the existing literature in focusing the investigation on the role of the member states' federal structure. A short discussion drawing mainly on the theory of fiscal federalism provides the basis for an empirical model. Using a sample of 13 European countries in the period from 1975–1995 we estimate the effect varying decentralization among the member states has on the conditional effectiveness of Structural Funds expenditure. The results suggest that Structural Funds are more effective in promoting growth when the states exhibit a higher degree of decentralization.