Bidding rings and the winner's curse
扩展了合法卡特尔理论到关联私人价值和共同价值环境，发现共同价值环境下存在保留价时，合谋可能无法实现完全效率，这解释了美国联邦政府海上油气租赁拍卖中联合竞标较少的原因。
This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments. We show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments with a binding reserve price. In the latter case, collusion does more than simply transfer rents from the seller to the buyers, it also gives buyers a chance to pool their information prior to trade and make an efficient investment decision. However, full efficiency may not be compatible with information revelation. Buyers with high signals may be better off if no one colludes, leading to inefficient trade. This result provides a possible explanation for the low incidence of joint bidding, especially on marginal tracts, in U.S. federal government offshore oil and gas lease auctions.