Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem
研究了双边贸易模型中，当投资不可观察且可重新谈判时，合同如何通过信息传递实现最优，发现部分披露合同可能是最优的，且合作投资与信息不对称导致无法达到最优效率。
This article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship‐specific investment and renegotiation. In such a setting, a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model, namely that of transmitting information between the parties. The article shows that a partial‐disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract. If the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric, the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best, but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first‐best achievable.